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Stephen Parker
Welfare dependency and the logic of mutual
obligation
Introduction
There isa vast and rapidly growing body
of literature dealing with the intent,
implications and other issues
surrounding the controversial mutual
obligation policies. Generally speaking.
the literature on mutual obligation can
bedivided into two mainstrands. First.
many articles examine the practical
implications of the policy. delineate how
it might fail to achieve its goals.
exacerbate inequalities or highlight the
apparem tension between the rhetoric
and practice (e.g. Eardley. Saunders. &
Evans 2000; Mcinnes 2000; Sanders
1999).
The second strand includes the
examination of the historical
development ofcurrent welfare policies
in varying detail. Macintyre (1999). for
example. identifies a change in welfare
provision 'from entitlement (0
obligation'. while Harris (2001) also
tracks the changing framework of
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unemployment benefits from the end of
the Second World War to the ptesent.
Others (most notably Kinnear 2000 and
Moss 2001) examine the general
philosophical and ethical basis ofmutual
obligation in order to question its
appropriateness.
Both approaches to the study of
mutual obligation differ from the focus
here. I Such recent literature does not
investigate how the entrenched
philosophical and value basis of mutual
obligation is articulated or expressed in
and through the policy language and
rhetoric. Some articles have done this to
a degree in relation to homeIessness and
other policies (for example. Popp, 1995.
19%). but little has been done in
relation to mutual obligation. This
means that very little attention has been
given to the manner in which specific
meanings are embedded in the policy
rhetoric itself. how such meanings are
achieved. and how the language forms a
coherent. 'logical' whole.
This article looks at how specific
policy terms and concepts construct and
frame the policy context and therefore
prescribe certain policy directions. Policy
language goes beyond mere words but
is embedded in a specific set of values.
As Bessent observes:
Language is not simplythemedium via
which a simple correspondence is
established between certain states of
affairs in the world and the scientific
'[ruth' about social problems. It actively
constructs the truths it purports to
describe which the government must
then step in and address viaappropriate
social policy (Bessant 2002, p.14).
The approach raken here differsfrom
Bessanr'sanalysis ofmetaphor in welfare
policy rhetoric in some important
respects. It has a more narrow focus,
examining mutual obligation in
particular rather rhan welfare generally.
Also, it is not confined to viewing terms
as metaphors. It is important to address
key terms and concepts in the policy
language in order to highlight how these
define the problem of unemployment
and related issues in specific wayswhich
require specific policy responses. For the
policy makers. such policy terms create
an internally consistent system of
meaning which forms the framework for
mutual obligation.
Specifically. the paper analyses first
how the Howard Government's concerns
about alleged welfare dependence
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establishes the context of changes to be
made to social security provision. By
defining unemployment in terms of
dependence, the stage is ser for policies
which seek to remedy rhe problems
identified by rhe dependency
framework. Second, rhe analysis turns
ro how rhe underlying principles of
murual obligation are defined in practice
and work as a response [Q the norion of
dependency. In other words, what
follows is an analysis of the meanings
policy terms assume in the context of
the Government's ideological
framework. and how these meanings
shape the resultant policy.The aim is to
understand the inner logic of mutual
obligation rhetoric and how it is made
consisrent with the policy practice, while
simultaneously exposing the poverty of
such logic in order to highlight
inadequacies in the policy. In rhe
process, questions are raised suchas: how
is the mutuality in mutual obligation
defined in practice? Is the obligation
mutual? What underlying values render
the seeming disparity of obligations
legitimate?
Welfare dependence
The 'problem' of welfare dependence is
pivotal in shaping mutual obligation.
Despite beingsuch an essential driving
force of the policy, there is no explicitly
stated definition of ,dependency' in rhe
policy literature or in the rhetoric from
the Federal Government (Henman
2002, p. I). Often ambiguous or
contradicrory concepts liebehind the use
of the term. Nonerheless, a working
definition can be gleaned - with
powerful consequences!
What Is 'dependency'?
The term generally refers to the alleged
attitudes and behaviours of welfare
recipients who have come: (0 depend
upon the state for their means of
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existence. Bur this covers all recipients,
as by definition they are dependent upon
income suppOrt and are not self-reliant.
From the Government's perspective,
however, dependency implies that
recipients are not capable of self-reliance,
not because of a lack of employment
opportunities, but because they have lost
the desire to work as a consequence of
the nature of income support. Typically
it is longer-term recipients who are
purported to be in a state ofdependence.
However, the perceived rise in
'dependence' is also linked to an increase
in the numbers of people receiving
income support, As the former Minister
for Family and Community Services,
Jocelyn Newman has said:
Letme give some feel for the extentof
welfare dependency. While we have
record levels of employment, there are
now around 2.6 million people of
workforce ageon Government income
suppOrt payments - around 1 in 5. Ten
years ago, the figure was around 1.5
millionpeople,oraround 1 in 7 people
(Newman 1999b, p. 4).
According to Newman (2000a, P: 2),
this rise was because 'more than two-
thirds of these people [were] not required
to either look for work or make some
other contribution to community life'.
By identifying these issues, notions of
dependency are linked to all welfare
recipients. In applying the definition in
this way. the Government is playing on
the double meaning of dependence as
both 1) simple receipt ofincome support
and 2) a more serious 'condition' which
allegedly afflicts long-term jobless
people. This conflation points the way
to a particular approach to welfare
provision which casts the problem in
terms of individual recipients.
Amplifying the alleged causes and
consequences of dependency
The following quote from the former
Minister for Employment and
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Workplace Relations, Tony Abbott,
highlights many of the Government's
concerns foreshadowed above and
illustrates the underlying values in the
concept of dependence. He said:
In the absence of rigorous work tests,
welfare benefits pitched dose to thelevel
of minimum wages eventually create a
glass floorbelowwhichunemployment
cannot fall. Why do some people not
work? Because theydonothave to.Why
mighta generous safety netdesigned to
help people on the dole, coupled with
wage restraint designed to boost jobs,
only make unemployment worse?
Because for many people working has
become more trouble than it is worth.
Wage restraint mightindeedproduce a
glut of jobs but not of willingworkers
to fill them in the absence of either a
strong work ethic or a welfare system
geared to keepingpeopleactive (Abbott
2000b).
From this quote, there are three main
points to be made about the alleged
causes and consequences ofdependence:
1) what is the stated cause of
dependence: 2) how dependence is
purported to be caused and 3) how is
this assumed to affect the behaviour of
recipients. These are addressed below.
First. according to the Government's
scheme of welfare provision, it is the
w~lfau start itulf which is the main
contributor oflong-terrn unemployment
and reliance on income support. Welfare
dependence is said to be the product of
a social security system which does not
require recipients to strive for self-
sufficiency through paid employment.
According to Tony Abbott, '[T]he role
of the welfare system in creating and
sustaining unemployment has been one
of the great unmentionables of
Australian public policydebate' (2000b).
'In fact', Abbott stated elsewhere, 'official
compassion arguably has done as much
harm as good by trying to alleviate the
results of poverty rather than its causes'
(2001, p. I). Thus, it is the perceived
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causes of the lack ofself-reliance among
reCipients.
Increasingly, the concept of
dependency is not only applied to
unemployed jobseekers (those on
Newsrart allowance) but to many other
income support recipients of working
age. The assumption is that because
recipients ofpensions (disability or aged,
for example) and parenting allowances
are not required to fulfil work tests, they
are susceptible to dependence. Again,
this conflates receiving income support
with the notion ofdependence.
The second point to be derived from
Tony Abbott's quote above explains how
traditional welfare is said to be a cause
ofdependence. The alleged 'harm' done
by 'official compassion' is that despite
employment opportunities, many
people on welfare do not take up
employment because 'guaranteeing the
wherewithalfor lifecan easily remove the
motivation for work' (Abbott 200 I, P:
2). According to this view, income
suppon payments are set at or near the
leveloflow paid work but do not requite
the skill or effort needed for
employment. This, combined with high
taxrates on recipients' earnings from any
part-time work, docs not provide any
incentive [0 take up employment
particularly when income from welfare
is guaranteed. Thus the Government
asserts that for many: 'working is almost
more trouble than it's worth' (Abbott
200I,p.I).
Thirdly, as a consrqumu of the lack
ofobligations on recipients in return for
payments, there is the perception that
the system is open to exploitation. The
assertion made here goes beyond the
language about the negative work ethic
which allegedly is the result of the social
security system. According to Newman,
'our entrenched culture of welfare
dependency has meant that certain
membersofour community arenot only
prepared, but feel entitled to exploit the
social safety net' (I999b, p. 4). Income
suppOrt which requires little of its
recipients is said to foster a 'hammock
men taliry' and an 'en trenched
entitlement mentality' whereby people
come to expect 'something for nothing'
because they arenot requiredto earn the
money they receive (Newman 1997, p.
2: Abbott 2000a, p. 4: Newman 1999b,
p. 3). Therefore, prolonged income
support is seen to not only inhibit the
desire to work but increase the
attachment to welfare.
The alleged consequences of
dependency go beyond not wanting to
work to not being abl« to work:
dependency is said to deprive recipients
of valuable social and work skills. As
Minister Newman stated: 'Long-term
dependency can have major social and
economic consequences. It can lead to
erosion of work skills, lower incomes,
poorer health and risk of isolation from
the community' (I 999c, p. 6). Such
recipients are said to lack work skills,
responsibility, social networks, the
capacity to participate in mainstream
society, the desire to work and the
financial incentives to move into paid
work. Further, dependence is assumed
to 'reduce people's opportunities to
participate fully in society' resulting in
'poor skills and poor chances in the job
market' (Newman 1999c, p. 6: 1997b,
p. 4). They thus become less than full
citizens, implying an inferior moral
status. Such a definition emphasises that
individual deficiencies are caused by
'permissive'welfare and thus contribute
to long term unemployment (Abbott
200 I, p. 4). The implication is that long
term reliance on welfare renders it
difficult for the 'victim' to function in
modern society. In fact, according to the
policy-maker's scenario, the 'victims'
become dysfunctional.
Such a definition of dependence
places the responsibility for
unemployment on individual recipients
and their alleged deficiencies. According
to Government logic therefore, the
definition lays the groundwork for
policies which place emphasis on
individual responsibility and correcting
perceived behavioural deficiencies.
What does the government
response need to be to counter
'dependency'?
After diagnosing the perceived faults in
the welfare system - in terms of'welfare
dependency' and self-reliance - the
Government prescribes specific policy
solutions. Changes in the income
support structure respond to the
following concerns: the increase in the
number of recipients: the relative lack
of obligations on recipients; and the
consequent alleged behavioural traits of
recipients (that is, dependence). In doing
so, the so-called reforms seek to address
two main areas: the inadequatestructure
ofpast 'official compassion' (to useTony
Abbott's words): and individuals'
responsibility for themselves.
Although these foci may seem in
tension, it is the emphasis on individual
responsibility which assumes
prominence. The income suppOrt
structure is said [Q be deficient because
it does not do what it should, that is,
foster 'a culture of self reliance' (FaCS
2000a, P: I). In the words of the
Government, reform should change the
system 'from a largely passive, rigid
structure that does not consistently
reward work, to [a system] based on
engaging people in active social and
economic participation' (FaCS 200 I, p.
2); assist to 'maximise peoples' capacity
to improve their lives and (Q participate
more fully in the social and economic
life of their communities' (Newman
1998b, p. 4); and foster 'independence,
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choice and self-reliance' (Newman
1999a, p. 3). What has been acceptable
policy for decades - entitlement based
income support - is diagnosed as the
cause of the current problem. In other
words, the underlying intent of the so-
called reform is to modify the social
security structure so that it increases
individual responsibility and therefore
overcomes dependency.
Further unpacking of mutual
obligation can be achieved by taking into
account the Government's definitions of
what is 'mutual' and what arc:
appropriate 'obligations'. Such
definitions build upon, and converge:
with, the issues arising from theconcept
of 'welfare dependence'. The following
section of the discussion reveals the
internal coherence of such policies.
Mutual
The underlying assumptions of 'welfare
dependence' - that is, that recipients
need ro be more self-reliant - inform the
working definition of 'mutuality' and
help to make the official rhetoric appear
more consistent with the policy practice.
The working definition of'muruality' in
the context of welfare dependence can
be exposed by identifying what the
Government thinks it owes jobseekers
and what obligations are then attributed
to jobseekers, It will then be possible to
illustrate how 'mutuality' appears to
make sense in light of mutual
obligarion's philosophical framework
and value base.
The Governmenr defines mutual
obligarion as 'a broad set of policy
initiatives based on the simple yet
compelling premise that responsibility
between the community and the
individual flows both ways' (Newman
1999b, p. 3). This definition implies that
what is provided by the state should be
balanced by jobseekers 'giving something
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back' to the community (Howard in
Eardley et al. 2000, p. 5). This allegedly
'compelling premise' invokes notions of
a 'social contract' and a 'two-way street'
in which responsibility and obligation
supposedly applies to both parties (the
state and the individual). The
Government defines such obligations
thus:
. .. partofthe contract the Government
has with the Australian people is the
principle of mutual obligation. There
are rwc sides to this. The Government.
on behalf of the community, has an
obligation to help those who cannot
provide for themselves. We do this by
paying income support and providing
other assistance. This includes
employment services to help people get
work.
In return, people who get income
suPPOrt from the Government have an
obligation to tell the truth about their
situation and do their very best to find
work. In some cases though, people can
get paid if they make a contribution to
the community (Newman 1998a. p. 2).
From this statement, implications
can be drawn not only about the nature
and balance ofthe obligations in mutual
obligation, but the values which
underpin it and the deeper meanings
which can be deduced from common
policy terms. These can be addressed first
by delineating what obligations the
Government attributes to itself
Expeclations: Ihe state and Ihe
Individual
On the one hand, the Government
assigns to itself the obligation to provide
income support and other minimal
services which (combined with tighter
eligibility criteria and with more
penalties for non-compliance) are
supposed to foster self-reliance. Despite
the general claim made in the quote
above, an examination of the publicly
available policy literature shows a general
reluctance on the part of the
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Government to explain sp«ifically what
it considers it owes to jobseekers. As
indicated, the Government claims that
its main obligation is to provide 'income
support' and 'other assistance'. Other
types ofassistance, such as employment
services which would seem to be vety
important in gaining employment, are
relegated to an inferior status and usually
included after the financial contribution
made by the state.
For example, Cenrrelink has stated
that the i\ustralian community supports
[jobseekers]... by paying income suPPOrt
and offering self-help facilities and
referral services' (2001, p. I). Newman
has also recognised the Government's
responsibiliry 'to provide adequate
income support and other services'
(2000b, p. 4). There is no real
acknowledgment of the mpomibility to
provide any additional assistance which
may be necessary for recipients to get
work, other than referral to private
agencies.
On the other hand, jobseekers (and
other income support recipients) are
assumed to be indebted to society
because they receive 'financial assistance
from taxpayersdollars' (Newman 1999a,
p. 3). Prime Minister John Howard has
stated that 'those in receipt
of... assistance should give something
back in return' (Eardley et aL 2000, p.
5). Similarly, Newman argued that those
in receipt of income support 'should be
encouraged to give something back to
the community for that financial
support' (l997b, p. 2). Thus, after a
certain period on payments, jobseekers
are obliged to participate in activities in
addition to their job search
requirements, the aim of which is to
either increase individual jobseekers'
employability or to contribute
something to society (for example, part-
time or 'voluntary' work). Failure to
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comply may invoke penalties (breaches)
including a total loss of income support
for a set period.
Mutuality?
From the above, what can be said about
the extent ofmutuality between the two
parties? It is arguable that mutual
obligation is not mutual in the sense that
it isequal; the two sides are not balanced.
Vet the Government obviously believes
it is equal. The questions which follow
this argument would be: how is it that
existing policies can be identified as
'mutual'? In other words, what
underlying values render the policy
rhetoric of mutuality consistent with
policy practice?
The answer may be found in the way
mutuality, or even equality, of
responsibility is defined by the
Government. In general usage, the term
'mutual' might imply a degree ofequality
between the two sides, a sense that what
one gives and receives is balanced by
what the other parrygives and receives
and that responsibility is shared evenly.
In fact this definition is invoked by the
Government in such statements as
'Mutual obligation holds that
individuals have responsibilities to the
community as well as the other way
round. Itencompasses the notion of'give
and take' which is part of every dealing
worthy ofthe term relationship' (Abbott
2000a, p. 3).
By invoking this sense of mutuality
between parties. it is made to appear as
if they share responsibility equally and
fairly and that the distribution of
obligations is reasonable. In terms of the
philosophical framework of mutual
obligation, there is no tension between
the rhetoric and practice and no lack of
mutuality. Mutual obligation becomes
'mutual' in the Government's outlook
becauseit addresses the perceivedreasons
why jobless people 'cannot' provide for
themselves: that is, because they are not
encouraged to be self-sufficient.
A 'truly mutual' welfare system, in
this context, involves individuals being
self-reliant, with the role of the state
'reduced' to helping those in genuine
need to become independent. Put
differently, the distribution of
obligations is accorded the status of
'mutual' because the policies seek to
overcome dependence or avoid it
altogether. However, this concept of
mutuality is distorted as it essentially
masks the lack of mutuality and
effectively legitimises a disparity of
responsibility. As will be argued below,
it also camouflages the power exerted
over jobseekers by the Government in
imposing specific obligations.
Obligation
Having seen how the concept of
mutuality works in practice, we need to
analyse the function of the term
'obligation'. In such an analysis, the
question which needs to be asked is: how
are increased and strengthened
obligations and penalties for non-
compliance defended? How can they be
considered fair or appropriate? In
addressing such issues, other questions
need to be considered, such as, where
does the obligation really lie? What is
the nature of such obligations? The
following argument illustrates that the
currentdistribution ofobligations under
mutual obligation reveals the policy's
underpinning values.Again, the working
definition of'obligation' builds upon the
concepts embedded in the notions of
'welfare dependence' and 'mutuality'.
Mutual obligation issaid to be based
on the 'premise that responsibility
between the community and the
individual flows both ways' <Newman
1999b, p. 3}. Implicit in this premise is
the assumption that the act of receiving
income suppOrt generates an obligation
(Moss 2001, p. I). That is, if a person
invokes their right to welfare, they are
therefore obliged to the providers ofthat
support in one or more ways. People
turning to the state in times of need,
especially during periods of
unemployment, are said to be obliged
to 'give something back' to the
community which supports them (Moss
2001, p. I). If 'hard working men and
women' (Newman 1999b, p. 5) subsidise
unemployment payments, the argument
goes, then those who 'benefit' from
income support should be compelled to
become self-relianr once again and
overcome dependence. While on the face
of it, this belief seems as compelling as
any home-spun philosophy, critical
analysis raises some important issues.
Forexample, what is there about the
act ofreceiving unemployment or other
benefits which inherently generates a
particular obligation? It is an ascribed
obligation, a constructed obligation,
which arises from prior perspectives
about the defects of previous social
security arrangements in allegedly
undermining values and behavioural
characteristics which the Government
pnzes,
Second, what can be said about the
nature of the obligations <as opposed to
their distribution} imposed on both
individual recipients and the state? One
of the major criticisms of mutual
obligation is the relative power held by
recipients and the Government. On the
one hand, people receiving income
support must fulfil the conditions
imposed on them in order to receive
payment. They have no choice but to
accept the rulesand regulations imposed
upon them by the Government or face
the reduction, suspension or cancellation
of their payment. On the other hand,
the Government has the power to define
what obligations must be fulfilled and
the penalties applied for breach of those
JustPolicy' No. 32, June 2004
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achieve self-reliance among recipients.
On the other side of the coin, the
Government's attributed obligations to
directly assist jobseekers are deliberately
weakened so as discourage dependency.
At the same time, the self-imposed
obligation to foster self-reliance is
strengthened through increasing
requirements and penalties for
recipients. In this sense, the Government
is not 'giving' recipients concrete
services, hut providing the context in
which jobless people supposedly learn to
provide for themselves. The 'obligation'
here is thus distinct from what would
normally fall under the definition of
'being obliged' to another - that is to
give to someone. The meaning of
'obligation' thus becomes distorted as it
used to defend the exerciseofpower Over
those considered to lack essential and
desirable characteristics.
By defining self- reliance as a
preferred characteristic, policies which
increase the obligation to become
independent seem logically justified.
According to Government rhetoric,
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define a person's place in society. As
Abbott has commented: 'a dollar earned
isdifferent from a dollar received' (2001,
P- 3). To not endeavour to become self-
reliant is to disadvantage the rest of
society through higher welfare costs and
a larger public sector. According to this
view, it is therefore expected that
dependent welfare recipients should
become, or be obliged to become, like
the idealcitizen: self-reliant, ealling upon
one's own resources in preference to
calling upon others.
Further, because welfare dependency
is said to remove both the motivation
and ability of recipients to become
independent it therefore becomes
legitimate for the Government to impose
more stringent requirements - to keep
people active - and penalties for non-
compliance. In the words of the
Government, rhis is done by 'making
work pay' and therefore 'making non-
work not pay' (Abbott 2001, p. 4). In
this context. it is considered appropriate
to increase not only the number but the
fora and strength of obligations to
How obligations are justified
The justification for obligations to which
recipients are bound can be found in the
underlying values of the policy. These
stem from both the importance of self-
reliance and the nature of dependency
in the Government's philosophy. As
argued above, self-reliance is itself
perceived to be a virtue, a desired
characteristic, an 'ought' which should
obligations, Moreover, the Government
isable to define what its own obligations
ate, to establish crireria For the
fulfillment of those obligations and to
set itsown penalties for non-compliance,
In reality, neither the Government, nor
Cenrrelink, nor the private agencies
which constitute the Job Network, are
'obliged' in the same way as recipients,
and certainly, they do not faceequivalent
penalties for failure to fulfil their
obligations which includes loss of
livelihood. Their obligations do not
carry the same weight if not fulfilled.
Thus the policy is not only a
constructed 'mutual obligation' but the
obligations are enforced and punitive.
The power associated with the
obligations iscamouflaged and mollified
through the language of 'mutuality'
which asserts that obligations are fait.Put
difierenrly, the obligations invoked by
mutual obligation, as noted by many
critics, are not fairlyor evenlydistributed
but are enforced with the clout of
government regulations. A question
begged here is: how can such obligations
be defended?Addressing such a question
involves analysing the underlying
philosophical nature of the obligations
and illustrating how obligations reveal
the theoretical underpinnings ofmutual
obligation. Once again, this analysis
builds upon the Government's
definitions of 'dependence' and
'mutuality' to produce a justification for
specific obligations.
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strengthened obligations on jobseekers
are considered to correct the balance
berween the rights and obligations of
income support recipients, a balance
which has been distorted by
'unconditional welfare'. Therefore,
obligations can be considered fair and
'reasonable' because they are deemed to
achieve an ideal social and economic
objecrive: self-reliance (Commonwealth
of Ausrealia 2002, p. 4).
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated how murual
obligarion is constructed as a response
to 'welfare dependency'. It has done this
by analysing the reality created by policy
rhetoric. Bydefining dependence as both
a product of individual deficiency and
ofan ineffective welfare system, policies
which place greater emphasis on the
obligations ofindividual recipients while
reducing the responsibility of the state,
are legitimised and consider 'fair'. In
doing so, the concepts behind
'dependency', 'mutual' and 'obligations'
build on the presupposirions of the
others to foreshadow a specific policy.
As such, the language employed is
greater than the sum of its parts and
creates a self-legitimising discourse.
By defining the problem of
unemployment in terms of the lack of
obligations on recipients the policy
becomes a matter of correcting the
balance of what is given and what is
expected. The shifting balance of
obligations under mutual obligation is
seen to achieve the ideal equilibrium of
rights and responsibilities because it is
said to place due emphasis on self-
reliance. As self-relianceis considered the
ideal state for citizens, then policies
which emphasise it are legitimised.
Obligarions are mutual and appropriate
if they place due emphasis on self-
reliance.
However, what is asserted as a
'balance' is really an imbalance; what is
asserted as parity is the disparity heavily
in favour of the Government.
Nonetheless, the 'imbalance' between
what is received and given by recipients
has been carefully constructed by the
Government'srhetoric in such away that
its logic seems axiomatic. Once the
imbalance has been constructed and the
symptoms identified, the alleged
personal and social malaise is diagnosed
and the corrective becomes a punitive
policy. In this way, from the recipients'
perspective, 'mutual' is a ruse which
distorts the nature ofobligation which,
in turn, is a euphemism for force despite
the rhetoric of choice.
Furthermore, the focus on
dependency as a result of personal failure
and a deficient welfare system takes the
emphasis away from other possible
policy responses. By defining the
problem with welfare thus, no mention
is made of, for example, a failure of the
market (Q provide suitable sustainable
employment which, in turn, leads to
more people relying on welfare for longer
periods. By casring the problem in the
language of 'dependency', the
Government's masks its own values: that
of individual responsibility (especially
for life crises), smaller government (that
is, less in the way of publicly managed
labour market programs) and a belief in
the infallibility of the market. As Moss
notes, mutual obligation 'recasts the
issue in terms of the attitudes and
motivations of those affected by
structural unemployment: an approach
that ignores the demand side of the
economy by seeing the problem as one
that lies with the arrirudes and
dispositions of labour itself' (200 I, p.
7).
Notes
The difference between Kinnear (2000)and
Moss (2001) and the present paper is the
analysis of lttnguage in revealing the philo-
sophical content and value base of mutual
obligation.
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